


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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		<b>DATE</b> 25 July 79	
<b>TO:</b> D/OPA			
<b>ROOM NO.</b>		<b>BUILDING</b>	
<b>REMARKS:</b>  <div style="text-align: center;"><p><del>HB</del> <del>HB</del> C/CAC 6500 C 1 C/USSR 6617 C/SRE</p></div>			
<b>FROM:</b> NIO/USSR-EE			
<b>ROOM NO.</b>		<b>BUILDING</b>	<b>EXTENSION</b>

FORM NO. 044

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3886-79  
25 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Robert R. Bowie  
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM : Arnold L. Horelick  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Mini-SCC Meeting and Senator Stone Briefing

REFERENCE : Memo to Vice President fr DD/NFA dtd 24 Jul 79  
subject: Recent Military Trends in Cuba

1. On Monday, 23 July at 2:30 pm, David Aaron chaired a mini-SCC meeting to discuss recent evidence of a Soviet ground force presence in Cuba and to consider how to approach Senator Stone's demand that the President take action to back up his pledge to oppose any Soviet effort to establish a military base in the Western Hemisphere.

2. Attendees included David Newsom and Viron Vaky, State; Bob Pastor, Bill Odom, and Marshall Brement, NSC; Mike Armacost, OSD, and Arnold Horelick, CIA.

3. I opened by briefing the group on the contents of our IIM, reviewing the evidence in some detail, indicating what additional collection efforts were in train, but also stating it was unlikely that major uncertainties and ambiguities would be resolved in the next week or so.

4. The event that immediately precipitated this particular meeting was advance warning that Senator Stone intended to raise the Soviet presence issue publicly in connection with a demand that the President take some action to carry out his pledge to oppose creation of a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere. Aaron requested that I brief Senator Stone along the IIM lines on the following day and that State provide someone to accompany me to handle any questions that might be raised about the US-Soviet 1962 and 1970 understandings (Dean Howells, INR, was later selected).

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NFAC #3886-79  
25 July 1979

5. Yesterday at 11:30 Howells and I briefed Senator Stone, who left a closed SALT hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to receive the briefing. Dean Howells' memcon of the briefing is attached at Tab A. Attached at Tab B is a copy of Stone's proposed letter to the President, which he gave me. (I understand he did indeed send the letter yesterday and that he has now gone public with it). [redacted]

25X1

6. Vice President Mondale is meeting with Senator Stone today (The meeting was scheduled before the Senator sent the letter to the President and may have been intended to dissuade him. I am not sure what the purpose of the meeting is at this stage). We prepared a memorandum yesterday for the Vice President's use in his meeting with Senator Stone today, see Reference. [redacted]

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7. I expect that Senator Stone and perhaps others will revert to this subject during the SALT hearings. [redacted]

25X1



Arnold L. Horelick

Attachments:

Reference -- [redacted]

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Tab A -- State's memcon re Senator Stone Briefing

Tab B -- Senator Stone's proposed letter to President

cc: DDCI

DISTRIBUTION: all copies with Tabs

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NIO/USSR-EE/ALHorelick, [redacted]  
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AF 6297  
HORELICK  
C. G. H.  
ERD

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT** : Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

**PARTICIPANTS** : Senator Richard Stone (D. Florida)  
Arnold Horelick, NIO/USSR-EE  
W. D. Howells, Deputy Director, INR/PMT  
Robert Flaten, H

**DATE AND PLACE** : Rm 4229, Dirksan Senate Office Building  
11:30 AM - 12:30 PM, July 24, 1979

**COPIES TO** : S/MS - Dr. Shulman  
PA - Mr. Carter  
PM - Mr. O'Donahue  
L - Mr. Feldman  
H - Mr. Atwood  
S/P - Mr. Kreisberg

INR - Mr. Mark/Mr. Packman  
EUR/SOV - Mr. Shinn  
ARA/CCA - Mr. Smith  
S/S-S - Mr. Hughes  
ACDA - Mr. Newhouse  
NSC - Mr. Aaron

In response to his Saturday request to the White House, Senator Stone was briefed on Soviet military activities in Cuba. Stone was quite familiar with most details but was unaware of a few key items such as the fact that Cubans, not Soviets, are flying the MIG-23s, that two nuclear capable ECHO II subs had made port calls, and that a GOLF II sub has visited in 1972 as well as in 1974.

Stone was miffed that, after having acceded to Secretary Brown's request not to make public the discovery of a brigade-level "command structure," the press cited "administration sources" as confirming such a presence. He termed this a "serious mistake" as an intelligence compromise but was told that the Soviets knew we could detect such a presence.

Stone's main theme repeated several times, was that the Soviet pilots, ship visits to Cuba (with or without servicing), and now a ground force unit all constituted a "nibbling away at us" and the "creeping" growth of a Soviet base in Cuba which not only violated the US-Soviet understandings but also invoked the

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President's assurance in his letter of January 27, 1978 that the US would resist such a base. He reiterated his request that the US make public all the exchanges between the US and USSR regarding Cuba, "draw a line" on what would and would not be acceptable and then enforce the resulting understanding.

25X1  
25X1  
25X6

Stone said he viewed the presence of a Soviet "command structure" in Cuba as a political "opportunity" for the President to be tough with the Soviets by demanding its withdrawal and thus to reassure the American people of the Administration's resolve not to permit Soviet violations in Cuba, SALT or elsewhere. He said it should be easy to force the Soviet ground unit out. Such evidence of resolve, he implied, would gain his support for the SALT Treaty. He gave us a copy (attached) of a letter to the President urging this and said he would be making the letter public.

We told Stone that we shared his wish and the "understanding" could be more specific but that it would be difficult if not impossible to do so because of the difficulty of distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable weapons systems and because of the impact of a Cuba precedent on our own freedom of action. Stone said Cuba was a special case because of the missile episode and should not be considered a precedent in precluding Soviet "access to naval facilities" as well as a "base." We also emphasized that, on the basis of present intelligence, we could not determine whether the Soviet "brigade" was a combat unit or a training unit subordinated to the advisory group but that we were working hard to determine its nature and, until we had evidence to the contrary State/INR, at least, tended to believe it was a training unit.

Drafted by: INR/PMT:WDHowells *WTH*

Concurrence: H:Mr. Flaten

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RICHARD (DICK) STONE  
FLORIDA

COMMITTEES:  
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND  
FORESTRY  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 24, 1979

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Last year you publicly issued a commitment which stated that it would be the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere.


I am deeply concerned about continuing, undenied reports of Soviet presence and activities in Cuba. This is especially true in light of open Cuban support for anti-government movements in Latin America. This concern is what prompted me last year to ask for this policy commitment from you.

During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the SALT II Treaty, top-level Administration witnesses have been questioned about the still-secret agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. I asked Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to make the terms of this agreement public, because it is important during the SALT II debate to know whether or not the Soviet Union has lived up to these commitments concerning Cuba. I would again respectfully request that you tell the public what is known about this agreement, and about Soviet military activities in Cuba.

Last Friday and Saturday, major news organizations quoted senior administration officials as conceding that "they had received intelligence that the Soviet Union was setting up a high-ranking command structure in Cuba." Further, these officials were quoted as saying that "this command structure would be able to handle a brigade-size force, while insisting that no such force has been brought to Cuba."

Mr. President, in my view the continuation of such a command structure by the Soviet Union in Cuba does constitute Soviet efforts to establish a military base. Therefore, I ask that you take appropriate steps to effect its removal.

Sincerely,

  
Richard (Dick) Stone